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INTRODUCTION
Joel Seligman*
On the weekend Don Schwartz finished the final revision of
his article in this Symposium, he died after a long bout with
cancer. Don was corporate law's renaissance man; at once
scholar, teacher, practitioner, advisor to the New York Stock
Exchange, consultant to the American Law Institute, a friend to
virtually everyone in the field. His several books and more than
forty articles earned him near universal respect; his wit and
openhearted friendliness made him a beloved figure. Up to the
end, his spirit never flagged. Two days before Don's death,
Georgetown Law School's David McCarthy went from a Dean's
search committee meeting to visit Don in the hospital and was
greeted with the mock-serious declaration, "I decline your offer
to be the next Dean." As the inventor of the thirty-second meet-
ing-the longest time Don would spare between telephone
calls-he doubtless would have been a superb Dean. As it was,
he left the field of corporate and securities law a better place
than he found it, having rowed a laboring oar on such projects as
Campaign GM, federal chartering, and corporate governance re-
form. More than that, he had the capacity always -to be one of
your best friends no matter how long it had been since the last
time you saw him. I count myself fortunate to have known this
wise, kind, and charming man.
During the 1970s, the most significant consideration of corpo-
rate governance reform occurred since the New Deal period.1
The origin of this examination was a series of major corporate
bankruptcies and fraud cases that strongly suggested the exis-
tence of widespread deficiencies in the performance of corporate
boards of directors. Most significant was the failure of Penn
Central, which at the time of its bankruptcy in June 1970 was
the nation's largest railroad company and sixth largest industrial
corporation. After an exhaustive study, a staff report of the
House Banking and Currency Committee concluded: "It is not
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B., University of California, Los Ange-
les, 1971; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1974.
1. See generally Seligman, A Sheep in Wolf's Clothing: The American Law Institute
Principles of Corporate Governance Project, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 325, 328-40 (1987).
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so much what they [Penn Central's board of directors] did, but
what they did not do that helped cause the Railroad's decline."2
Subsequent financial press and academic literature empha-
sized that the somnolent Penn Central board of directors was
typical of most giant corporations' boards in the postwar period.
The most influential academic study, conducted by Harvard
Business School Professor Myles Mace, began with the premise
that the board's statutory legal duty to "manage" the business
and affairs of the corporation was a myth.3 After conducting nu-
merous interviews with corporate executives and directors, Mace
concluded that boards of directors in large or medium-sized
firms had ceased to function as meaningful checks on chief exec-
utive officers.4
No series of events better illustrated the deficiencies of the
corporate board of directors than the Securities and Exchange
Commission questionable payments (or corporate bribery) cases.
Corporations involved in the cases had created "slush funds"
and concealed their existence through the falsification of both
internal corporate records and statements filed with the SEC.
Through 1981, close to 400 firms voluntarily admitted having
used the slush funds either to bribe foreign or American officials
or to make illegal American campaign contributions. The SEC
took another ^sixty-two firms to court, where it proved the exis-
tence of questionable payments.' An SEC report published in
May 1976 underscored the significance of these cases:
The almost universal characteristic of the cases re-
viewed . . . has been the apparent frustration of our sys-
tem of corporate accountability . . . . Millions of dollars
of funds have been inaccurately recorded in corporate
books and records to facilitate the making of questiona-
ble payments. Such falsification of records has been
known to corporate employees and often to top manage-
2. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING & CURRENCY, 92D CONG., 1ST SEss., THE PENN
CENTRAL FAILURE AND THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 149 (Comm. Print 1972).
3. M. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 8 (1971).
4. Id. at 178-90, 205-07.
5. E.g., The Activities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy of the House Comm. on Inter-
national Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 181-85 (1975); 44 SEC ANN. REP. 27-31 (1978);
Personal Communication from Chiles T. A. Larson, Deputy Director, SEC Office of Pub-
lic Affairs (Feb. 26, 1987).
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ment, but often has been concealed from outside auditors
and counsel and outside directors.6
In the aftermath of the questionable payment disclosures, sev-
eral proposals to reform corporate governance were widely de-
bated, among them former SEC Chairman William Cary's pro-
posal to enact federal "minimum standards" for corporate law.
Cary's proposal was motivated by his belief that state legisla-
tures had long relaxed statutory corporate law requirements in
order to increase incorporation fees, and that in Delaware, the
state where a plurality of large firms were incorporated, the judi-
ciary had rendered decisions "on the basis of a desire to foster
incorporation in Delaware."' To remove the incentive to incor-
porate in Delaware or other "chartermongering" states, Cary
proposed enactment of a federal statute that would establish
standards of officer and director conduct for all firms above a
minimum size."
In 1976, Ralph Nader, Mark Green, and Joel Seligman ad-
vanced a more far-reaching proposal. These authors recom-
mended the federal incorporation of all industrial, retail, and
transportation firms with sales in excess of $250 million that em-
ployed 10,000 or more persons.9 Under a proposed federal stat-
ute, each federally chartered firm would be led by full-time di-
rectors. 10 To ensure a board's independence from the operating
management it reviewed, directors could be nominated only by
shareholders not affiliated with the firm's operating executives.1"
The most controversial aspect of the Nader proposal was the
utilization of "constituency directors," an attempt to ensure
board concern for a corporation's chief effects on employees and
neighboring communities, as well as on shareholders. 2
The election of President Ronald Reagan in 1980 effectively
ended the 1970s movement for corporate governance reform.
Paradoxically, the need for a new approach to corporate govern-
ance may be greater than it was during the 1970s because of a
serious erosion in corporate law standards.
6. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, Hous. & URBAN AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss., SEC
REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES at a (Comm.
Print 1976).
7. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.
663, 670 (1974).
8. Id. at 700-03.
9. R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 240 (1976).
10. Id. at 121.
11. Id. at 127.
12. Id. at 253-55.
FALL 1988]
Journal of Law Reform
The major aspects of this deterioration have been:
* The adoption by the SEC of a rule that cuts back in part on
the principle of one common share, one vote-a requirement of
all companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange since
1926, and, in effect, the foundation of corporate governance. s
The one common share, one vote rule is essential to ensuring
that shareholders can elect "independent" boards of directors
and defeat those management proposals that are perceived by
shareholders to be self-serving. In contrast, elimination of the
rule will permit managers with minority common stock interest
to cast a majority of the votes. Removal of the one common
share, one vote principle, thus, may make it impossible to re-
place senior management, no matter how incompetent, and will
remove a significant device for ensuring economic efficiency.14
* The decision by the Delaware legislature to permit businesses
incorporated in that state to "opt out" of the possibility that
directors will be held personally liable for violations of the duty
of due care.15
- A number of highly questionable practices in the corporate
takeover arena. Two deserve special comment. In 1985, the Dela-
ware Supreme Court sustained the use of the "poison pill."", In
the form approved, this device permitted a corporate board of
directors, without shareholder approval, to issue rights to its
own shareholders permitting them, under specified conditions,
to buy shares in any bidding corporation at a fraction of their
then market value.17 The practical consequence of this technique
is to discourage tender offer bids. While this result may be desir-
able as a matter of national economic (or antitrust) policy, it is a
dubious development in corporate law for management to be
able to deprive shareholders of a bid significantly above market
value without shareholder consent.
"Greenmail" is another question-begging practice. Again,
without shareholder approval, management in many instances
has paid corporate bidders a substantial premium above market
value to sell their shares. This deprives shareholders of a possi-
ble above-market bid themselves. Nonetheless, in cases dating
13. Voting Rights Listing Standards-Disenfranchisement Rule, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 25,891, 25,891A, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) V 84,247
(July 7 and 13, 1988).
14. See generally Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The
One Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 687 (1986).
15. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1988).
16. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
17. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1348-49.
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back to 1964, the courts of Delaware and other jurisdictions have
generally permitted greenmail payments. 8
- The holding by the United States Supreme Court in 1987 that
federal securities claims under the Securities Exchange Act, in-
cluding those arising under Rule 10b-5, the commonly litigated
fraud remedy, may be committed to arbitration when standard
language appears in a securities broker-customer agreement. 19
The Court justified this result, in part, on the customer's volun-
tary acceptance of the standard arbitration clause.2 0 To date,
however, the SEC has been unwilling to adopt a rule requiring
brokerage firms to give customers a meaningful choice whether
to adopt or reject arbitration as a dispute-resolution device. In
reality, virtually every small individual shareholder account is
now subject to arbitration.
* Perhaps most significantly, the near universal approval by the
state courts of the "litigation committee" device to permit
boards of directors, when properly named as defendants in de-
rivative litigation, to name other untainted directors to a litiga-
tion committee for the purpose of recommending the dismissal
of the action. Before the 1970s, the power of the board to seek
dismissal of derivative actions against third parties had been
clearly established. But the extension of this power to seek dis-
missal of actions properly brought against the board itself is a
novel development. Unless ultimately reversed by the state
courts or by developments at the federal level, the policy will
significantly undermine the ability of the derivative action to de-
ter conflicts of interest or waste on the part of the board of
directors.21
It is, thus, an appropriate time to consider again the wisdom
of current corporate governance standards. The three articles in
this symposium do so from quite different perspectives.
Donald Schwartz, who was a major actor in the corporate re-
form debate of the 1970s,22 as he has continued to be in the cur-
18. See Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964). But see Heckmann v. Ahmanson,
168 Cal. App. 3d 119, 214 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1985).
19. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2343 (1987).
20. 107 S. Ct. at 2341, 2346.
21. See discussion and citations in Schwartz, Federal Chartering Revisited, 22 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 7, 10-12 (1988).
22. See, e.g., Schwartz, Federal Chartering of Corporations: An Introduction, 61
GEo. L.J. 71 (1972); Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Cam-
paign GM, 69 MICH. L. REv. 421 (1971).
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rent American Law Institute Corporate Governance project,2"
begins with a reprise of developments in the last two decades.
These developments persuade him that "federal legislation [is] a
more tenable thought" now than it previously had been.2 He
highlights the role of the ongoing American Law Institute pro-
ject, suggesting that "this effort may be the most important at-
tempt by the corporate community to reform itself.
'2 5
From a different point of view is the work of Lynne Dallas.26
Professor Dallas broadens the theoretical debate concerning cor-
porate governance that recently has been dominated by the "law
and economics" school, contrasting it with a highly original syn-
thesis of psychological and sociological literature. By comparing
her "efficiency" and "power" models, she is able to suggest that
our terms of reference in corporate law are too narrow, too artifi-
cial, and too brittle. In effect, she achieves in a broad terrain the
same type of reorienting of the theoretical debate that the struc-
tural bias articles of James Cox earlier achieved in the context of
litigation committees.2
Alfred Conard, in a major exploration of one of the most sig-
nificant institutional changes of the past three decades, focuses
our attention on the sleeping giants of corporate governance, the
institutional investors. He goes beyond the fashionable conclu-
sion of a decade ago that they would remain quiescent, either
because of the realities of portfolio management or the conve-
nience of the "Wall Street Rule,"2 and poses serious questions
that long ago should have been asked: Why are institutional in-
vestors so inactive in corporate governance? What would it
mean if they were activated? And, most significantly, what
should be done now? 29
23. See, e.g., COMMENTARIES ON CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE: THE ALI-
ABA SyMPOSIUMS 1977-1978 (D. Schwartz ed. 1979); Schwartz, Defining the Corporate
Objective: Section 2.01 of the ALI's Principles, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 511 (1984).
24. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 16.
25. Id. at 17.
26. Dallas, Two Models of Corporate Governance: Beyond Berle and Means, 22 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 19 (1988).
27. See, e.g., Cox & Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations
and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985,
at 83.
28. Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 117,
144 (1988).
29. Cf. L. LOWENSTEIN, WHAT'S WRONG WITH WALL STREET (1988) (answering related
questions in a very different fashion).
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